The 365 AI investment scheme, which promised daily returns of up to 15.5% on cryptocurrency deposits, ceased operations on June 30, 2025. Its website, 365-ia.net, became inaccessible, confirming the collapse of what authorities describe as a sophisticated Ponzi operation targeting global investors. The domain for 365-ia.net was privately registered on April 30, 2025, just two months before the platform vanished.
No information regarding the ownership or operational leadership of 365 AI appeared on its public-facing website. Financial experts often cite this lack of transparency as a primary red flag for fraudulent investment platforms. Without identifiable principals or a registered business entity, investors face significant hurdles in seeking accountability or recovering lost funds.
The platform offered no tangible products or services for sale. Instead, its operational model relied entirely on affiliate recruitment. Participants were incentivized to enlist new investors, forming a multi-level structure that paid commissions across three tiers: 10% for direct referrals, 2% for second-level recruits, and 1% for the third level. Additional recruitment bonuses ranged from 0.5 USDT for a single new affiliate to 150 USDT for 50 recruits.
Investors deposited Tether (USDT) into the system, with minimum investments starting at 15 USDT for the VIP1 tier. Advertised daily returns escalated with investment size, reaching 15.5% for VIP4 members who invested 2000 to 5999 USDT. This structure is a hallmark of a Ponzi scheme, where early investors are paid with funds collected from later participants, rather than from legitimate business activities. Such high, guaranteed returns are unsustainable and inherently predatory.
365 AI attempted to mask its true nature with technical jargon, referencing "cloud computing capabilities" and "Ai+ quantitative computing power." The platform claimed to use a "365AI GB200 Grace Blackwell super chip" that combined GPUs and a custom CPU. Users were instructed to log in daily and click a button, supposedly activating an AI-assisted cloud computing process that generated revenue. The platform then claimed to share a percentage of this generated revenue with the user. This "click a button" mechanism is a common ruse in crypto Ponzi schemes, providing a superficial explanation for payouts that are, in reality, derived from new investor capital. Similar schemes, including Aifeex, AI Profit USDT, and Nexus666, have used this identical narrative.
These operations rarely register with financial regulators like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the UK's Financial Conduct Authority, or similar bodies in other jurisdictions. This absence of oversight means investors lack the protections afforded by regulated markets, including deposit insurance or access to ombudsman services for dispute resolution. The schemes often operate from servers outside the reach of major financial authorities, making enforcement challenging.
The collapse of 365 AI follows a predictable pattern observed in hundreds of similar schemes. Before a complete shutdown, platforms often freeze withdrawals, citing technical issues or security audits. This tactic aims to delay payouts while operators attempt to extract maximum funds. After the collapse, the websites and associated applications typically disappear without warning, leaving investors with no avenue to recover their capital. Some scammers then initiate "recovery scams," demanding additional fees from victims under the false promise of unlocking frozen funds.
Organized crime syndicates, primarily originating from China, operate many of these "click a button" Ponzi schemes from clandestine scam factories located in Southeast Asian countries. These operations are often linked to human trafficking, where individuals are coerced or tricked into working under dire conditions to perpetuate the scams. The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned Cambodian politician Ly Yong Phat in September 2024 for his alleged ties to these Chinese human trafficking scam factories. Phat reportedly sheltered Chinese scammers through companies he owned in Cambodia.
International efforts to dismantle these networks have intensified. Myanmar reported deporting over 50,000 Chinese scam factory workers since October 2023. In late January 2025, Chinese officials visited Thailand to coordinate efforts against Chinese crime gangs operating from Myanmar. By early February 2025, Thailand announced it had cut power, internet access, and petrol supplies to Chinese scam factories along its border with Myanmar. These joint operations led to the freeing of ten thousand trafficked hostages from Myanmar compounds and the arrest of five Chinese crime bosses and 450 others across the Philippines by February 20. Despite these actions, reports in March suggested up to 100,000 people remained in Chinese Myanmar scam factories.
The crackdown in Asia prompted some criminal groups to relocate. By April 2025, new Chinese scam factories were reported in Nigeria, Angola, and Brazil. In Myanmar, the Myawaddy area, controlled by the Karen National Army (KNA), has been a known hub for these operations. The KNA, led by warlord Chit Thu and his sons Saw Htoo Eh Moo and Saw Chit Chit, allegedly profit from protecting Chinese criminals running these scam factories. On May 5, the United States imposed sanctions on Chit Thu, the Karen National Army, and his two sons, citing their central role in illicit cyberscam operations targeting Americans. Britain and the European Union had previously sanctioned Chit Thu. The persistent use of the "click a button" app model suggests a coordinated criminal enterprise behind the global spread of these Ponzi schemes.